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This paper explores crime risk within and around major transit systems, specifically by investigating theft of personal
property offences on the London Underground. The majority of studies to date have examined theft above ground,
predominantly at transit stations, although some studies have compared this with theft in nearby surrounding
areas. This study is unique and extends this analysis to theft during transit journeys below ground. The location of
such offences is often unknown, only discovered by the victim sometime after the event. A new technique termed
Interstitial Crime Analysis is used to better measure the location of below ground theft offences; these are
compared with above ground thefts using Spearman’s Rank tests for association. Key findings are: below ground
theft offences are concentrated at particular stations; risk is highest during morning and late afternoon peak travel
periods; at these peak times there is an elevated risk of theft at both high risk stations and in their surrounding
environs; and that this relationship is not evident during the inter-peak and late night time periods. The findings
suggest offenders who operate below ground may also operate above ground on major transit systems. This has
clear policy implications for policing these settings and highlights the importance of joint operations and information
sharing between transit agencies and local police forces operating near major transit systems.
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This empirical study examines theft from person of-
fences on underground mass transit systems. Four po-
tential settings of theft are identified; in the vicinity of a
station but outside its boundary; inside a station bound-
ary before the paid access barrier; within the paid access
barrier outside of carriages, and; inside a rail carriage.
For the purpose of this paper the first two settings are
described as above ground settings and the latter two as
below ground. This paper examines theft at these differ-
ent settings, in order to gain a better understanding of
risk. Specifically, the aim of this paper is to explore
whether there is a transmission of theft risk, from out-
side the transit system above ground, to inside the tran-
sit system below ground, and vice versa.
The research evidence here is mixed. On the one
hand, studies have asserted that the impact of a well-
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2014from surrounding high crime risk environments (Clarke
et al. 1996; La Vigne 1997). In direct contrast, other
studies have found that transit hubs with the highest
levels of crime tend to be situated within high-crime
areas (Block and Block, 2000; Loukaitou-Sideris et al.
2002; Newton, 2008, Ceccato et al. 2011). No studies to
date have examined this for theft from person offences,
and this study explicitly addresses this research gap.
In order to carry out this research however, it is neces-
sary to introduce a new technique, Interstitial Crime
Analysis (ICA). This is used to improve the measure-
ment estimates of the location of below ground theft on
transit systems. Victims of theft offences on transit sys-
tems often have imprecise knowledge about where and
when a theft occurred during their journey, they were
not aware at the time an item was taken and only dis-
cover it sometime after the event. Options for estimating
the location of a theft which could have occurred at or be-
tween several stations traversed during a transit journey
include; using the start station, end station, a random sta-
tion, or a midpoint station. On the London Underground
(LU) the technique that has been traditionally used is thean open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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ever, analysis based on any of these measures will be defi-
cient and based on skewed location data. A further option
would be to omit these offences from crime analysis but
for this study over 75% of theft offences on the LU were at
unknown times and locations. Therefore this paper uses
this ICA technique to better estimate the location of below
ground theft, and compares these with above ground theft
at known locations.
Scope
The scope of this research is restricted to one geograph-
ical area, the LU. This is a major mass transit system
(also referred to as a public transport system), hereafter
termed transit system, which carries in excess of 1,000
million passengers each year. The study is also focussed
on a single crime classification, theft from person, here-
after termed theft. The theft offences considered in this
study are usefully described as ‘stealth-crimes’ by Smith
(2008), an example of this is pocket-picking (also re-
ferred to as pick-pocketing) when an item is taken from
a victim in one place, and not discovered missing until
much later, normally somewhere else. This paper ex-
cludes snatch-offences, where a victim is aware at the
time of the offence that their property is being taken,
and other types of theft offences.
This paper does not attempt to compare theft offences
on the LU with other transit systems. There are inherent
problems due; to the diverse sizes of different transit
systems; the mixed demographic and socio-economic
conditions of areas they serve; the dissimilar times
they operate; and variations in reporting and record-
ing systems used (La Vigne, 1996). Indeed, as advo-
cated by Smith and Clarke (2000) it is more pertinent
to study transit crime patterns relative to the urban
areas they serve rather than compare them to other
regions. Therefore, this paper compares theft below
ground with theft above ground in the vicinity of the
LU transit stations.
In the financial year 2011/2012 the LU experienced
5,063 theft offences (British Transport Police, 2013), a
rate of four thefts per million passenger journeys. These
thefts constitute a large proportion (50%) of all crime re-
corded on the LU, a significant over-representation com-
pared to the proportion of theft across the rest of the
rail network in England and Wales (27%). These figures
have remained fairly consistent over time (Clarke, 1984;
Easteal and Wilson 1991; Burrell, 2007).
Research questions
The following questions were identified for this study:
 What patterns of theft exist below ground on the
LU? Is there a relationship between the distributions of
theft below ground on the LU and theft above
ground in the vicinity of LU stations?
 If a relationship does exist, how does this vary by
location and time across different settings on the
LU?
 Is there any evidence of a transmission of theft risk
between above and below ground settings on the LU,
and if so, what are the potential mechanisms for
this?
Underground transit system settings
Underground transit systems contain four distinct envir-
ons presented in Figure 1 as Settings A1, A2, B1, and
B2. For this paper it is contended these are all discrete
types of public space. Setting A1 is near to but outside
the boundary of a transit station; Setting A2 is inside a
transit station but outside of control barriers which re-
quire payment to proceed through; Setting B1 is inside a
station, within the paid area of a transit station, but out-
side of carriages, for example on a platform or stairwell,
and; Setting B2 is inside an underground carriage. These
four settings are present on systems which, by their very
nature, are highly transient. A number of persons will
enter, traverse, and leave transit systems over a relatively
short space of time. Therefore, at each of these four set-
tings there is a transient juxtaposition of potential of-
fenders, potential victims of theft, and potential guardians
against theft. Moreover, at each of these settings and over
the course of the day, offenders’ opportunities to commit
theft, passengers’ exposure to risk of theft, and the poten-
tial ‘windows’ available for supervisors and guardians to
deter or apprehend offenders, will constantly change, fairly
rapidly, within a small geographical setting.
This paper explores theft risk at each of these settings
in order to gain a greater understanding of the mecha-
nisms through which theft occurs on underground tran-
sit systems, and the degree to which there may be a
transmission of theft risk between these settings. For the
purposes of this paper, Settings A1 and A2 are consid-
ered to be above ground, and Settings B1 and B2 below
ground. Those responsible for safety and enforcement,
for example security managers and police enforcement
agencies, have clearly demarcated jurisdictions and
boundaries based on the above and below settings. On the
LU for example, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)
and City of London Police (CoLP) operate in Setting A1,
and the British Transport Police (BTP) operate in Settings
A2, B1 and B2, although there will be some ‘spill-over’ ac-
tivity between the two.
Passengers use all four settings, for work, leisure, tour-
ism, or other purposes. Their aim is usually to travel
from departure to destination point, and generally as
quickly as possible. For offenders however, movement is
Figure 1 Potential theft settings at transit stations.
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part of their daily routine activities (Felson and Cohen,
1980), or be attracted to a particular setting because of
the opportunities that it offers for theft (Brantingham
and Brantingham, 1995). Different offenders may operate
at each setting; or, offenders might travel through the
entire system or selected parts of the system, and there-
fore operate at multiple settings.
‘Formal’ and ‘informal’ barriers exist between these
four settings which may affect offender movement.
There are few obstacles when travelling between Settings
A1 and A2. To pass between Settings A2 and B1 re-
quires a fare payment in order to move through a phys-
ical barrier. If an offender moves from setting B1 to B2,
they have chosen to enter a rail car, which implies they
have chosen to leave the station they are currently at
and travel elsewhere, within new setting B2 until they
choose to exit it. These ‘barriers’ may restrict movement
between the four settings. Alternatively, movement to a
different setting may result in reduced levels of supervi-
sion, increased targets, and better opportunities for theft,
which might facilitate offender activity.
Mechanisms and settings: theft on underground
transit systems
Whilst a number of studies have examined crime in and
around transit systems (for good overviews see Smith and
Clarke, 2000; Smith and Cornish, 2006; and Newton,
2014), few have explicitly explored this for theft. There are
perhaps three key and inter-related issues evident in the
literature, namely that; the presence of transit systems can
influence and shape crime patterns in urban areas; transit
stations may act as attractors and or generators of crime;
and that transit stations serve as risky facilities.Theft on transit systems
There is evidence to suggest that the presence of a transit
system can influence and shape the crime patterns of
urban areas (Piza and Kennedy, 2003). On transit systems
a range of potential mechanisms can be identified for theft
offences. Firstly, transit systems cluster people together at
fixed locations in restricted spaces (Brantingham et al.
1991). Theft levels are greatest at transit stops and stations
with higher passenger densities and this has been consist-
ently found over a number of years (Smith and Clarke,
2000; Smith and Cornish, 2006, Newton, 2014). Indeed,
Loukaitou-Sideris (1999) adapted Angel’s 1968 idea of a
critical zone of population density beyond which violent
crime may occur, and suggested that on transit systems a
second critical zone of intensity may exist. If reached, this
critical point may be sufficiently high to mask and there-
fore promote less serious offences such as theft. Smith
and Clarke (2000) suggest that while robbery and violent
offences may be linked to a lack of supervision, theft may
not be. This second level density may be applicable both
the above and below ground settings of transit stations.
High passenger densities may offer anonymity to offenders
and a certain degree of jostling or bumping might be the
norm (Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2002).
Secondly, users of transit systems may be frequently ex-
posed to situations whereby they are more susceptible to
become targets for crime. The system congregates a num-
ber of different persons including ‘demographically high-
crime-risk people’ such as teenagers, unattached males
and those of low socio-economic status (Brantingham
et al. 1991), and these users of the system constantly inter-
change (Richards and Hoel, 1980). Passengers may be un-
familiar with areas and more susceptible to victimisation
(Block and Block, 2000; Piza and Kennedy, 2003). They
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cessible items, being pre-occupied, or distracted through
travelling with young children (Myhre and Rosso, 1996).
Again these may apply both above and below ground.
Thirdly, within transit systems passenger movement
and space is restricted to confined settings. The fixed na-
ture of transit stops (nodes) and routes (paths) restrict a
passenger’s choice of movement compared to other
forms of transport, for example cars, bicycles or when
on foot. Indeed, passengers have minimal control over
where and when they enter and exit a system, where a
carriage stops, and, once inside a carriage, it is difficult
to exit if someone ‘suspicious’ boards. On underground
systems passengers typically travel on only a few of the
available routes, and do not become familiar with areas
they traverse as they travel below the ground. On the
other hand stations offer easy and rapid entry and exit
points for offenders (Block and Block, 2000; Loukaitou-
Sideris et al. 2002), and they can linger at stations for
long time periods without arousing suspicion (Block and
Davis, 1996; Piza and Kennedy, 2003). Therefore, transit
systems are likely to be highly attractive to offenders. As
an offender traverses a transit system, particularly in
areas adjacent to their daily routines and paths (termed
routine activities by Felson and Cohen, 1980), they can in-
crease their awareness of potential crime opportunities. A
passenger’s knowledge of vulnerability is only likely to
change if they experience an offence, and, even if they be-
came a victim of theft, they may not know exactly where
and when this happened, thus cannot readily identify
where elevated levels of risk are. Anecdotally, it is possible
regular commuter trips, and increasing use of social media
and mobile technology such as smart phones, could result
in greater communication between passengers about
levels of theft risk on transit journeys. However, the latter
may also increase possible targets for offenders and assist
in communication between offenders.
Transit stations and hubs have been identified in the
research literature as potential crime attractors and
crime generators (Smith and Clarke, 2000). Crime
attractors draw offenders to them, they are locations
with known opportunities for crime. Crime generators
are subtly different, as the presence of a large number
of people (offenders and victims) brought together at
the same time and place can generate unplanned but
often favourable crime opportunities (Brantingham and
Brantingham, 1995). On public transit both are possible
(Smith and Clarke, 2000; Burrell, 2007, Newton, 2014),
and the main distinction tends to be time of day and type
of offence. Low level sexual assaults and thefts tend to
occur in crowded situations during peak travel times
(a possible crime attractor) whereas violent crimes are
more likely to occur in more isolated settings with lower
passenger densities (a potential crime generator).Transit stations have also been acknowledged as a
good example of ‘risky facilities’ (Clarke and Eck 2005,
Felson and Boba, 2010) as the majority of crimes that
occur at transit stations are concentrated at a small pro-
portion of stations; the so called 80/20 rule. This has
been found in a number of studies of transit stops and
stations (Loukaitou-Sideris 1999, Pearlstein and Wachs
1982; Newton and Bowers, 2007). Theft is concentrated
at crowded stations at peak travel times, during the early
morning and late afternoon rush hours (Burrows, 1980;
Pearlstein and Wachs, 1982; Kabundi and Normandeau
1987; Loukaitou-Sideris, 1999; Cozens et al. 2003;
Burrell, 2007). Research by Clarke et al. (1996) found
bag opening peaked between 0800 and 1000 hours, and
between 1600 to 1900 hours; the morning and afternoon
peaks for passenger travel. Levine et al. (1986) identified
that crowding was a feature at two bus stops they ob-
served with high theft levels. Additionally, Ceccato et al.
(2011) found theft rates at stations were higher during the
warmer months of the summer, and in larger stations with
more platforms.
It is less clear whether more transit crime occurs at
stops and stations, or on board carriages. Some studies
suggest more transit crime occurs at stations (DeGeneste
and Sullivan 1994; Loukaitou-Sideris 1999 and Loukaitou-
Sideris et al. 2002) and that the presence of drivers on car-
riages deters offenders. One study in the US found that
50% of transit larcenies occurred on trains (Smith and
Clarke, 2000). For this study more than 75% of theft was
at an unknown location, and could have occurred on car-
riages or at stations, which makes it difficult to compare
risk between these two settings on the LU.
The potential transmission of crime risk between transit
settings
The majority of studies on transit theft focus on known
offences at busy stations at peak times, in other words
above ground theft. One of the few studies to compare
crime offences inside a station with those outside a sta-
tion (La Vigne, 1996) found that levels of robbery and
Part 1 crimes within a station including larceny, thefts,
and pocket-picking, did not correlate with high levels of
these offences outside of stations. However, the analysis
of assaults did find a correlation between the inside and
outside environments. It is not clear what this relation-
ship was for pocket-picking as this offence type was ag-
gregated into the larger category of Part I crimes. The
low crime rates of the Washington D.C. transit system
were attributed to its design. It is difficult however to
identify why these design features did not insulate
against assaults. A potential explanation provided by the
author was that assaults are more likely to be committed
by persons living close to stations. However, very few
studies have actually examined offenders’ use of transit
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travel within their own borough to commit crime, and
Smith and Clarke (2000) suggest offenders tend to use
transit systems to commit crime in central business dis-
tricts but rarely to reach suburban areas beyond their
own localities.
There is some evidence of elevated crime risk around
transit systems, what Block and Block (2000) term the
environs of rapid transit. However, this is multifaceted
and complex. Bernasco and Block (2011) found that
whilst stations serve to increase the accessibility of an
area, their presence alone is not sufficient to increase
crime risk. Furthermore, the introduction of a new sta-
tion does not necessarily equate to an increased crime
rate in that area (La Vigne, 1996; Sedelmaier, 2003).
Moreover, if a minority of stations account for a large
proportion of crime (risky facilities) this then implies
that several stations actually experience few crime inci-
dents (Vu, 2009). It is argued therefore that there is a
poorly understood interaction occurring between transit
systems and their wider environment, termed spatial inter-
play by Robinson and Goridano (2011) The notion of a
spatial interplay and transmission of theft risk around
transit stations are key notions explored in this paper.
Bowers (2013) used a spatial regression model to
examine the relationship between internal theft, inside
risky facilities, and external theft, outside a facility. A
number of types of risky facilities were examined, al-
though underground stations were not included. The
paper also considered all personal thefts including
snatching and other theft. An interesting concept pro-
posed was that risky facilities may act as ‘radiators’, as
internal crime is transferred to external environments,
or as ‘absorbers’, as risky facilities absorb crime from
nearby high crime areas. Bowers finds evidence that
“internal theft problems precede external ones and that
the physical concentration of chronically risky facilities is
a particularly strong predictor of external theft problems”
and that “risky facilities act as crime ‘radiators’, causing
crime in the immediate environment as well as internally”
(pp unknown, advance access). This supports the notion
that there is a possible relationship between internal and
external crime at risky facilities. This paper explores this
specifically for underground train stations.
The risky facilities examined in the Bowers study only
consider theft at above ground settings (A1 and A2 in
Figure 1). Stations are perhaps a unique type of risk fa-
cility for several reasons: they are connected by the
below ground setting (B2); there is a paid access barrier
between the internal and external setting (A2 to B1);
and, entrance to and exit from a risky facility may be
through the entrance to that risky facility, or it actually
may be entered or exited from below ground, in other
words using a nearby station.This paper explores the possible transmission of risk
of pocket-picking offences between the above and below
settings of underground rail systems. The risk that mass
transit engenders is known not be uniform across the
system, yet the manifestation of theft inside transit sys-
tems, below ground, is not well understood, due to
current measurement deficiencies in the recorded crime
data. This paper therefore will address this through the
use of ICA.
Data and methodology
This section of the paper discusses the data used in the
study and the methodologies employed.
Data
This study uses data on theft offences captured both
above and below ground. For setting A1, offences were
extracted as recorded by the MPS and CoLP between 1st
April 2011 and 31st March 2012, using the following
Home Office (HO) classifications; shoplifting (HO classi-
fication 46); theft person (HO classification 39); and
theft other (HO Classification 49). Records were ex-
tracted that occurred within 100, 250 and 400 metre
buffers of LU stations. A discussion of using this buffer
method for capturing theft offences ‘around’ stations is
provided later. For settings A2, B1 and B2 offences were
extracted as recorded by BTP between 1st April 2011
and 31st March 2012, and the following codes were cap-
tured; theft luggage (J02), theft personal property (J03),
theft from the person (J04) and shoplifting (J22). For set-
ting A2, only those offences with known locations, in
other words those known to have occurred at LU sta-
tions were included. For settings B1 and B2, offences
captured by BTP that occurred as part of a transit jour-
ney at unknown locations were used to inform the ICA
analysis.
Interstitial crime analysis
The Interstitial Crime Analysis (ICA) measure is calcu-
lated using the following procedure. Using extracted
codes J02, J03 and J04, offences were categorised by
those that occurred above and below ground based on
the station location code. The ticket boundary was used
to define the transition from the unpaid (A2) to paid
(B1 and B2) environments. A small proportion of re-
cords were excluded as they could not be categorised into
A1, or B1 and B2. A probabilistic modelling technique
was used (Gill, 2007) to calculate ICA values. This is based
on a similar technique to Aoristic Crime Analysis which
was developed by Ratcliffe (2002) to better estimate the
times of burglaries between two time periods, from exiting
a house, to discovering a burglary. Ashby and Bowers
(2013) compared this technique with alternative methods
for estimating temporal uncertainty in crimes, and found
Newton et al. Crime Science Page 6 of 142014, 3:1
http://www.crimesciencejournal.com/content/3/1/1aoristic crime analysis to be the most accurate. The ICA
method is used to better estimate the locations of under-
ground thefts between a start and end station.
Take theft 1, which is a hypothetical example in
Figure 2. If a theft victim starts their journey on the
Victoria Line at King’s Cross St. Pancras station, and
discovers their purse missing at Oxford Circus station,
then, their journey involves a start station (King’s Cross
St. Pancras), three intervening line segments, and an end
station (Oxford Circus). Interpolating the risk of theft be-
tween these five settings, namely, two stations and three
segments, generates a probability value of 0.2 at each of
the five possible settings along the victim’s journey. How-
ever, a further possibility is Theft 2 (Figure 2), where a
passenger starts at Kings Cross, changes at Euston, and
discovers the theft at Warren Street. Here there are again
five possible locations of theft, three stations, including
one interchange, and two segments. This methodology
was repeated for all journeys on the network to give a cu-
mulative probability risk for each station and each route
segment (Figure 2). This analysis assumes there is an equal
likelihood of theft at a station or interchange or on a car-
riage between stations. Potential limitations of this will be
discussed later.
For each station, an ICA score was generated using
below ground thefts (settings B1 and B2; N = 4,237).
This was calculated for 249 valid LU stations. One sta-
tion was excluded as it was closed during the time
period under consideration. London Docklands Light
Railway (DLR) stations were also excluded due to miss-
ing information. The cumulative probability measure
described in Figure 2 provide a minimum of three cu-
mulative probability scores at each station; two route
segments, one to the station, and one from the sta-
tion, as route segments operate in two directions; and
the individual station value. To calculate the ICA risk
score for each individual station, the cumulative prob-
ability values for each station, plus the total numberFigure 2 Calculating the ICA: hypothetical example.of contiguous route segments (to each station or from
each station segment) were added together, and this
was then divided by the number of lines each station
serves, as stations can serve multiple lines, to produce
an average ICA value for each station. In addition to
the ICA score for each station, an adjusted ICA score
was calculated, the ICA value standardised per million
passenger journeys at that station (ICA adj*).
The ICA also allows analysis to be bounded by user
specified times of the day. A restriction is that passenger
journeys are available on an hourly basis, so the ICA
adj* measure can as a minimum estimate theft risk per
passenger per hour, as will be demonstrated later in this
paper. However, different time periods can be selected
and theft risk within these cross-sectional time periods
can be examined, for example for a full 24 hour time
period, or for peak and off peak travel times.
This measurement estimation has been termed Inter-
stitial Crime Analysis for the following reasons. An in-
terstice is defined as an intervening space, especially a
very small one, originating from the Latin interstitium,
which derives from intersistere, to ‘stand between’ (Oxford
English Dictionary ND). Interstices were originally used in
the Chicago school by Burgess in his 1925 concentric
model of residential zones as an alternative name for the
concentric zone of transition, termed the interstitial area.
The use of the interstitial spaces of crime can be identified
in the literature on crime, for example Felson (2006) who
describes these as in-between areas near to where people
go for legitimate activity. On transit systems Felson et al.
(1996) identify interstitial areas at the Port Authority
Terminal. Whilst not all settings on transit systems
can be considered truly interstitial, it is proposed here
that this term is appropraite to describe this method
of crime measurement. It refers to a method that es-
timates crime locations between places, and, it is
based on settings where there is constant transition,
the movement of both people and rail carriages.
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For this research, four values of below ground theft (set-
ting B1 + B2) were calculated. The need to distinguish
between crime counts (number of offences) and crime
rates (offences per person at risk) is well established, for
example burglary per 1000 dwellings or robbery per
10,000 persons. Ceccato et al. (2011) demonstrated how
passenger journeys can be highly influential to crime risk
on transit journeys. For this paper annual passenger
journeys per million passengers were used as a suitable
denominator, and four possible measures of below
ground theft were calculated for each LU station using
both the new ICA measure and the traditional EOL
measure and these were:
 EOL, non-standardised counts of theft using the
EOL measure;
 ICA, non-standardised counts of theft using the ICA
measure;
 EOL adj*, theft rates standardised per million
passenger journeys using the EOL measure; and;
 ICA adj*, theft rates standardised per million
passenger journeys using the ICA measure.
In order to answer the posed research questions the
following methods were adopted; firstly, a Lorenz Curve
was used to test whether stations exhibited characteris-
tics of risky facilities, a large proportion of theft should
occur at only a few stations; secondly, estimates of the
locations of below ground theft risk were visualised
using proportional circles in a Geographical Information
System (GIS) to examine their spatial distribution; and
thirdly, to test the relationship between below and above
ground theft, Spearman’s Rank correlation analysis was
used to compare theft above ground in settings A1 and
A2, with theft below ground in settings B1 and B2 com-
bined (B1 + B2). The results of this analysis are now de-
scribed in detail.
Results and discussion
This section presents the main findings of this research
and a discussion of the results.
The distribution of below ground theft
The literature suggests stations will act as risky facilities
for theft and will exhibit the 80/20 rule; that most theft
occurs at a small proportion of stations. In order to
examine this, Lorenz Curves were produced (Figure 3).
For theft at known locations above ground, setting A2 in
Figure 1, this relationship is evident; approximately 80%
of theft happens at about 20% of stations. Figure 3 also
includes Lorenz Curves for estimated below ground theft
risk, the ICA and ICA adj* scores. Although the concen-
trations evident for these two estimates are not as strongas the theft above ground, both below ground measures
still estimate a large proportion of theft at a small pro-
portion of stations. For the ICA adj* scores it is esti-
mated that 50% of theft occurs at 20% of stations, and
75% of risk occurs at 40% of stations. Whilst this is not
strictly an 80/20 result, this is not an exact science. Fur-
thermore the measure is actually likely to underestimate
the risk at stations with highest theft levels, and overesti-
mate this at low risk stations. This is because in the con-
struction of ICA scores, for every transit journey that
experienced a theft, all stations and route segments that
journey are assigned an equal probability of risk. The
EOL produced a similar curve to the ICA, and the EOL
adj* produced a similar result to the ICA adj*, therefore
both techniques here demonstrate evidence of risky fa-
cilities; below ground theft is concentrated at a small
proportion of stations.
The locations of below ground theft estimated using
the ICA and ICA adj* measure were mapped using a
GIS. They are shown as proportional circles for ICA
(Figure 4) and ICA adj* (Figure 5); stations with higher
scores are represented by larger circles. In Figure 4, theft
offences tend to be pulled towards the centre of the
transit network, which represents stations with higher
passenger numbers. In Figure 5, adjusted for passenger
journeys, the ICA adj* score is dispersed more spatially,
through the network. It is no longer pulled towards the
centre of the network, yet concentrations are still evi-
dent at particular stations, the most risky facilities. A vis-
ual comparison with the EOL measure showed that this
estimate skewed thefts towards stations at the end of
lines, and, when standardised by passenger journeys, the
EOL adj* did not alter substantially. This suggests visu-
ally that the ICA adj* is a superior method to the EOL
adj* for estimating below ground theft and this method
will be used for further analysis in this paper, although
EOL adj* comparisons will be drawn where appropriate.
Theft above ground: at and near to stations
The next stage of this research was to test the relation-
ship between above ground theft near transit stations
(Setting A1) and above ground theft at transit stations
(Setting A2), and the results of this analysis are provided
in Table 1. This shows that stations with high counts of
theft from person tend to have high levels of theft in
their surrounding environs (shoplifting; other thefts; and
theft from person). When standardised by passenger
journeys, it is evident that only theft from person of-
fences are significantly correlated between settings A1
and A2 (rho = .219, N = 249, p = 0.00). Thus, there is evi-
dence of a relationship between theft from person rates
(pocket-picking) inside stations and near stations, but
this is not evident for shoplifting and other theft once
standardised as rates per million passenger journey.
Figure 3 Lorenz Curve: inequality in shares of theft per station.
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categories of theft near stations, although correlations
are low and only significant at the 95% confidence level.
Theft above and below ground
Three distinct settings were examined, A1 and A2 above
ground, and B1 and B2 below ground. Currently the ICA
method cannot distinguish between settings B1 and B2,
thus below ground settings where the location of theft is
unknown are depicted as a combined value (B1+2). The
relationship between thefts at these settings was exam-
ined using the Spearman’s Rank correlation tests for as-
sociation. Results are presented in Table 2. The ICA adj*
score for theft from person below ground was positively
and significantly correlated with above ground theft
for; theft from person near stations in Setting A1 (rho =Figure 4 Theft risk below ground in transit stations: risk estimated us0.228, N = 249,p = 0.00); and theft from person at stations
in Setting A2 (rho = 0.280, N = 249, p = 0.01). This was
also negatively and significantly correlated with shoplifting
at stations in Setting A2 (rho = −0.277, N = 249, p = 0.00).
Other theft types did not show significant associations.
Theft below ground estimated using the EOL adj* method
was not significantly correlated with theft above ground.
Theft above and below ground by time of day
Previous research has demonstrated that theft is most
prominent at peak travel times during the rush hour.
Therefore as an extension to the previous analysis, theft
above and below ground were compared by across differ-
ent times of the day periods. These were constructed
based on passenger usage models of the LU recommended
by Transport for London (TfL), and also a visualing the ICA measure.
Figure 5 Theft risk below ground in transit stations: risk estimated using the ICA adjusted measure.
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The classifications used were: early (02.00-06:59); am peak
(07.00-09:59); inter-peak (10.00-15:59); pm peak (16.00-
18:59); evening (19.00-21:59); and late (22.00-01:59). Theft
offences were subdivided into these six categories and
standardised by passenger counts for the equivalent time
periods. A further consideration here is the time categor-
ies used are not equal in terms of the total number of
hours available, some have a larger time window withinTable 1 Correlation between theft at stations and theft
near stations (250 m buffer), London Underground,
1st April 2011 to 31st March 2012
Spearman’s correlations (rho)
Crime counts A1: Near stations
Shoplifting Other
thefts
Theft from
person
At Station (A2) Shoplifting −0.09 0.03 0.07
Theft of personal
property
0.06 *.158 0.11
Theft from person **.284 **.490 **.502
Crime rates (per million
passenger journeys)
A1: Near stations
Shoplifting Other
thefts
Theft from
person
At Station (A2) Shoplifting *-.158 *-.192 *-.159
Theft of personal
property
−0.08 −0.11 *-.201
Theft from person 0.07 0.03 **0.219
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level;
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.which theft could be committed. Therefore, theft was fur-
ther standardised, by passenger numbers per million jour-
neys, and per available hour of risk, and the results are
presented in Figure 6. This shows as expected the morn-
ing and afternoon peak travel times have the highest rates
of theft per passenger per hour, and thus these time cat-
egories were considered appropriate for this analysis.
For each of the six time periods, theft above ground
(A1) was compared with theft below ground (B1+2)
using Spearman’s Rank correlations tests and the results
of this are presented in Table 3. This shows the theftTable 2 Correlation between theft near stations (250 m
buffer), theft at stations, and theft below ground on the
London Underground, 1st April 2011 to 31st March 2012
Spearman’s correlations (rho)
Theft from person (per million
passenger journeys)
A1: Near stations
Shoplifting Other
thefts
Theft from
person
Below ground
theft (B12)
End of Line −0.09 *.141 0.108
Interstitial
Crime Analysis
*-.132 *.135 **.228
Theft from person (per million
passenger journeys)
A2: At stations
Shoplifting Theft
property
Theft from
person
Below ground
theft (B12)
End of Line *-.180 0.044 .045
Interstitial
Crime Analysis
**-.277 −0.115 **.280
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level;
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.
Figure 6 Theft on the London Underground by time of day (standardised by passenger volumes and available hours in each
time period).
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cantly and positively correlated with theft above ground
(A1) during the am peak (rho = .169, N = 249, p =
0.00) and the pm peak travel times (rho = .261, N = 249,
p = 0.00). It also identifies significant correlations for early
morning (rho = .425, N = 249, p = 0.00) and evening time
periods (rho = .190, N = 249, p = 0.001). However, and this
was perhaps not expected, correlations were not found
with theft above ground during the inter-peak and late
night time periods. A comparison with the EOL adj*
method found no significant correlations between above
and below ground theft for any of the six time periods
examined.
Discussion of findings
The results of this analysis support the current literature,
and suggest that theft from person on the LU is concen-
trated at particular stations and particular times of the
day. Stations exhibit expected characteristics of risky fa-
cilities, a large proportion of thefts occur at a small pro-
portion of stations (the 80/20 rule). This is evident both
above ground (A2) and below ground (B1 + B2), andTable 3 Correlation between theft near stations (250 m
buffer) and theft below ground on the London
Underground by time of day, 1st April 2011 to 31st March
2012
Spearman’s correlations (rho)
Theft from person (per million
passenger journeys per hour)
A1: Near stations
Shoplifting Other
thefts
Theft from
person
Interstitial
Crime Analysis:
Below ground
theft (B1+2)
Early (02–06:59) 0.087 **.375 **.425
Am peak (07–09:59) −0.05 **.173 **.169
Inter-peak (10–15:59) −0.083 0.025 0.105
Pm peak (16–18:59) *-.129 *.127 **.261
Evening (19–21:59) −0.06 0.084 **.190
Late (22–01:59) *-.132 0.012 0.026
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level;
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.holds true when examining both theft counts, and theft
rates standardised by per million passenger journeys.
The ICA analysis also suggests that theft on under-
ground systems is highly transient, and the risk is not
uniform across the system and changes spatially by time
of day. The analysis also suggests that the ICA adj*
method is more appropriate for examining theft risk on
the underground than the EOL measure.
This paper also contends that there is a transmission
of theft risk between the above ground and below
ground settings. A comparison of theft near stations
(A1) and at stations (A2), both above ground shows a
positive significant correlation for theft from person; this
relationship is not evident for other theft types. More-
over, when comparing theft above ground (settings A1
and A2) with theft below ground (settings B1 + B2), it
was evident that stations with a high risk of theft below
ground are located in areas with high levels of theft
above ground, and this applies both at stations (A2) and
near stations (A1). Again this applies to theft from per-
son and not other theft types. Upon further examination,
it was found that the significant positive correlations evi-
dent between the above ground settings near stations
(A1) and the below ground (B1 + B2) settings inside the
LU, were only apparent at certain times of the day, and
that the strongest relationships were evident during the
peak travel times. During the inter-peak and late night
times, theft above and below ground were not correlated.
This suggests that there is a transmission of theft risk
between the above and below ground settings of the LU,
which is especially evident during peak travel times, and
specifically for theft from person and not other types of
theft offences. Indeed, there were some negative rela-
tionships found between shoplifting and theft from
person.
There are a number of potential explanations for this
identified likely transmission of theft risk: those factors
conducive to theft below ground and above ground are
similar, but different offenders operate at each setting;
that the same offenders operate below ground and above
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contended here that that the same offenders operate be-
tween these different settings and that the transition be-
tween each setting, including access though paid barrier
controls (A2 to B1) is not a major obstacle to move-
ment. The introduction of anonymous travel cards on
the LU including; pre paid Oyster cards, a top up pay as
you go plastic smartcard for travel that does not need to
be registered to individuals and can be bought using
cash; and all day travel cards that can be bought with
cash; may have reduced the deterrent effect of paid
access control, especially for theft, as offenders are
able to travel all day undetected and unrestricted for
relatively cheap amounts, compared to the potential
rewards gained.
Further to this, it is suggested stations with good op-
portunities for theft both above ground (A1 and A2) and
below ground (B1 and B2), have the highest levels of
theft risk, and that this risk is greatest at peak travel
times. Outside of peak travel times it is possible of-
fenders seek alternative stations or settings outside of
transit environments, as there are fewer passengers, there-
fore less targets and less anonymity, and detection may be
more likely. Indeed, the juxtaposition of favourable condi-
tions for theft above and below ground at peak times may
not be present at off peak times. At night-time the
favourable theft settings for above ground theft may be in-
fluenced by the location of establishments that serve alco-
hol, and thus these may be very different to those during
the peak travel times, and the optimal conditions for theft
above and below ground experienced at peak travel times
may not correspond with this night-time period.
It is also suggested that offenders who commit theft
from person offences near and inside transit systems are
perhaps specialised, as relationships were not found be-
tween areas with high levels of theft from person and
other theft types. Indeed some negative correlations
were found between theft from person and shoplifting.
The most likely explanation here is offenders who com-
mit shoplifting are different to those who commit theft
from person offences, due to the different skills sets
required.
Limitations
This study used recorded crime data provided by three
organisations, BTP, the MPS, and the CoLP. A limit of
using recorded crime data is that it will under-estimate
actual levels of crime. On transit systems the extent to
which this occurs is unknown, although Levine and
Wachs (1986) suggest actual levels of crime on transit
systems may be 20–30 times that of reported levels, a
possible limitation of the BTP data. Levels of theft outside
transit systems are also known to be under-reported, and
it is estimated only 29% of thefts in England and Walesare reported (Chaplin et al. 2011) which may be a limita-
tion of the MPS and CoLP data. However, this analysis
compares theft across different settings inside and near
transit stations. There are no obvious reasons why theft at
or near one station will be better reported than that of an-
other station in London. Therefore, it is not thought the
under-reporting will bias the correlation analyses carried
out in this study.
The buffer zone selected for crime near stations
(Setting A1) was theft within 250 metres of a station.
This could be criticised as the size of the buffer used
for theft near stations may impact on the sensitivity
of the correlations observed. The analysis in sections
4.2 and 4.3 was repeated using 100 m and 400 m
buffers to see if any discernible differences were ob-
served. Similar correlations were found using all three
buffers. Therefore, it is suggested the 250 metre buf-
fer zone chosen is an appropriate buffer for Setting
A1, theft near a station.
A limitation of the ICA method is that it assigns an
equal risk to all settings below ground, thus a station
and a route segment are assigned the same probabilities
of theft. During a passenger journey, each route seg-
ment, each start and end station, and each interchange,
are all given an equal weight. This equality of risk could
be criticised, for example; are platforms more risky, is
entering a carriage more risky, or is being on a carriage
more risky? Due to the transient nature of these settings
this risk may constantly vary. Unfortunately it is not
possible at present to distinguish between theft in setting
B1 and setting B2, and detection rates for theft on the
LU are low (4%, BTP, 2013). Furthermore, a range of fac-
tors could influence risk and these include; the average
journey time between each interstice; the average waiting
time at each platform; the number of carriages on a
train; the length of each platform, and whether more
passengers wait at the front, middle or rear of the plat-
form, which may be a result of where the entrance and
exits to each platform are situated. At present settings
B1 and B2 have been assigned equal values of risk in the
construction of the ICA score although future work
could seek to refine this modelling procedure.
Conclusions and future research
This paper has introduced a new technique termed ICA,
in order to better identify the location of underground
theft on mass transit systems. Through this innovative
methodology, the paper has explored the distribution of
theft below ground on the LU, and, also, the relationship
of this to above ground theft, both at stations and in
their immediate vicinity. The ICA measure was com-
pared with the EOL technique for estimating the loca-
tion of below ground theft. The findings suggest the
ICA measure more appropriate than the EOL, and that
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journeys) is an appropriate measure of identifying theft
risk below ground on the LU.
The findings are consistent with the research litera-
ture; stations act as risky facilities and most theft is con-
centrated at a small proportion of stations and during
peak travel hours. This research extends the current evi-
dence base however, as it is also able to estimate risk of
theft below ground on the LU. It finds that both the
below and above ground settings exhibit characteristics
of risky facilities, especially at peak travel times. More-
over, stations with high levels of theft tend to have envir-
ons (settings adjacent to the station) with similarly high
levels of theft. Findings of some previous studies, that
good design can insulate stations from external condi-
tions are not replicated in this study. Indeed a likely
transmission of theft risk is observed, between the above
and below ground settings of LU stations.
It is contended from this that there are three possible
mechanisms of theft that emanate on transit systems
and their nearby environs. These are:
 the presence of ‘uni-nodal’ offenders – who operate
at only one station or a limited number of
proximate stations;
 the presence of ‘multi-nodal’ offenders – who
operate between multiple terminals;
 system causes of theft – driven by the juxtaposition
of busy stations and favourable opportunities for
theft created by the presence of transit settings;
 other causes of theft.
Whilst these may not be mutually exclusive, the evi-
dence presented in this paper suggests the second and
third options are more probable. Further research should
explore these hypotheses in more detail.
Policy implications
The findings of this research highlight particular areas
for future policy development for preventing theft, both
inside and near to transit stations. The first of these is
that the research suggests offenders do not distinguish
between below and above ground targets, and that BTP,
CoLP and the MPS should consider more joined up op-
erations to target offenders who commit theft. Even if
the actual offenders are different, the high risk locations
of theft above and below ground tend to be similar espe-
cially at peak travel times. However the research finds
no evidence that those who commit thefts will only spe-
cialise on transit networks, or only outside of transit net-
works. A transmission of risk between the above and
below ground environs is more likely. It could be
hypothesised that offenders act in the knowledge that in-
formation is not well shared between the differentenforcement agencies, and move regularly between the
above and below settings discussed in this paper, to
avoid detection and suspicion. Additionally, it is evident
that theft on the underground is dynamic and mobile
and prevention activities should thus be designed and
implemented accordingly, for both short term detection
and longer term prevention. The adoption of the ICA
model by BTP should enable further improvements over
time, as the more the model is used, and the more data
is included in this model, the more it is likely to itera-
tively improve in its estimation of the location of the
below ground theft. Further refinement could include
weightings for risk of theft below ground, on carriages
and inside stations (settings B1 and B2).
Future avenues for research
A clear finding from this analysis is theft offences on the
LU are not uniform but are highly transient in both
space and time. There is some evidence of a spatial
interplay in the environs of transit stations (between
above and below), but this is still poorly understood. A
closer examination of features present in settings A1,
A2, B1, B2 and their influence on theft may help to bet-
ter understand risk and influence future prevention
techniques. These could include for example; the in-
ternal design of a station and features such as the presence
of cash points (ATMs), lighting, CCTV and lines of sight.
There are also features around stations that influence theft
opportunities such as the presence or absence of different
land features, for example shops, residential dwellings,
and bus stops. A future research avenue should be to
examine the spatial interplay of these features, their influ-
ence on theft, and furthermore how this may vary at dif-
ferent times of the day, for example peak versus non peak
travel times.
Further research is needed into the extent to which of-
fenders may use transit systems to facilitate their move-
ment and activities. A hypothesis that could be tested is
whether offenders who commit theft on transit systems
operate using crime scripts, similar to the master crime
scripts used by burglars. Upon entering a property a
burglar will often first visit the master bedroom, then a
main living room, and so forth. The hypothesis here is
that an offender will first visit their preferred location
for offending, station A. If they do not find suitable con-
ditions to offend, they may then move to station B, and
this movement may be via the underground. They may
identify opportunities to offend whilst travelling on the
underground between station A and B. If an offender
does not find a suitable theft opportunity they may then
move to station C, their third preference, and so forth,
or even back to station A. A research avenue here would
be to identify what characteristics make station A more
attractive to offenders, both above and below ground,
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day of week. Whilst offender interviews would be one
potential mechanism for exploring this, site visits at high
and low risk stations may also uncover some of these in-
fluences on theft.
A final area for further research is to examine the type
of items stolen by offenders. Whilst crime in England
and Wales has been reducing for a number of years
(Chaplin et al. 2011), this reduction has not been observed
for theft person. Some anecdotal reports suggest theft of
mobile phones may be a driving force behind this. There-
fore an important analysis would be to examine the items
stolen in theft from person offences on transit stations,
similar to the CRAVED principles (Clarke and Eck 2005)
used in other studies. On transit systems this should also
be examined by location and time of day.
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